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Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through 
self-governed monitoring and sanctions. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of 
decentralized sanctioning institutions where punishment opportunities are restricted to agents who are 
linked through alternative punishment networks. We find that the structure of the punishment network 
significantly impacts contributions to the public good, but not overall efficiencies. Contributions collapse 
over decision rounds in groups with limited punishment opportunities, even if the absolute punishment 
capacity corresponds to the complete punishment network where all agents are allowed to punish each 
other.  However, after allowing for the costs of sanctions, efficiencies are similar across the different 
networks that allow for punishment and the no-punishment network.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
There is widespread experimental evidence that the availability of costly peer sanctioning can have a 
large positive impact on cooperation in social dilemma settings and thus may contribute to the well-
functioning of societies (e.g., Ostrom et al. 1992, Fehr and Gächter 2000, Masclet et al. 2003, Walker and 
Halloran 2004, Sefton et al. 2007). However, this evidence is based primarily on the comparison of two 
extreme cases; all subjects can punish and be punished by other subjects in the group versus a situation 
where no one can punish. Typically these criteria are not met in the field where punishment opportunities 
are determined by factors like the physical closeness, endowments, similarity in status, or, more 
generally, the social network of actors. 
Punishment networks, which define who can punish whom, may play a nontrivial role for 
inducing more efficient provision of public goods or appropriation from common-pool resources. In 
particular, it seems plausible that more dense punishment networks, where a larger fraction of actors can 
punish each other, deter actors more effectively from non-cooperative behaviors. This increased 
deterrence in more dense networks may be associated with the threat of being punished by more agents 
and/or the possibly larger combined punishment capacity.  However, it seems equally plausible that more 
dense punishment networks deter actors less effectively from non-cooperative behaviors if actors believe 
that the threat of being punished diminishes as the number of potential punishers increases. This is a 
reasonable conjecture if the second order free-rider problem becomes more severe and effective 
coordination of punishment becomes more difficult. In addition, the structure of the punishment network 
may determine agents’ willingness to cooperate. For example, contributions and assigned punishments 
may be reduced if there are agents who cannot be disciplined due to their location outside the punishment 
network (‘untouchables’). Alternatively, such agents may refrain from cooperating because of social 
preferences, (i.e., conditional cooperation, Fischbacher et al. 2001; inequity-aversion, Fehr and Schmidt 
1999; revealed altruism, Cox et al. 2008) 
In this paper, we provide new empirical evidence on the role of punishment networks for 
facilitating cooperation. In a linear public goods experiment, we vary the structure of punishment 
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networks, the capacity by one individual to punish another individual, and the maximum punishment an 
individual can receive. In our experiment, groups of four agents make contribution and punishment 
decisions across twenty rounds of repeated play. There are six treatments in this study: (1) a complete 
punishment network, (2 & 3) pairwise punishment networks with low and high punishment capacity, (4 & 
5) untouchable punishment networks with low and high punishment capacity, and (6) a no-punishment 
network. Treatments 1 and 6 are the two extreme cases on which the literature has focused so far. In the 
‘pairwise’ networks, a group of four is divided in two pairs and punishment can only take place within 
pairs, although contributions affect the entire group. In the ‘untouchable’ networks, there are three agents 
that can punish and be punished by each other and one agent who cannot punish or be punished. We 
manipulate the individual punishment capacities in these two networks in order to investigate if the 
observed behavior is driven by the structure of the punishment network or the punishment capacity.  
Our findings reveal that the structure of the punishment network significantly affects 
contributions and punishments, but not economic efficiencies. Varying the capacity for one individual to 
punish another is found to play a less important role on aggregate contribution levels. Contributions 
collapse over decision rounds in the pairwise network, even when the capacity to punish one’s partner is 
increased such that the maximum punishment the partner can receive is identical to the complete network. 
Moreover, contributions are significantly lower in the pairwise network than in the untouchable network 
and the complete network. In fact, contributions in the pairwise network are statistically indistinguishable 
from the low contribution levels in the no-punishment network.  
The average willingness to punish is least pronounced in the pairwise networks, whereas there is 
no difference between the untouchable and complete networks. Group efficiencies are very similar across 
the different punishment networks and the no-punishment network. The reason is that higher contribution 
levels come at the cost of more pronounced punishment which reduces the incomes of the punishing and 
punished agents. Finally, we also observe that subjects condition their contributions on subjects in their 
punishment network and on subjects outside their punishment network (and vice versa).  
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We contribute to the economics literature testing the effectiveness of various institutional 
arrangements in social dilemma situations (e.g., Isaac and Walker 1988a&b, Ostrom et al. 1992, Fehr and 
Gächter 2000, Masclet et al. 2003, Bochet et al. 2006, Anderson and Putterman 2006, Cinyabuguma et al. 
2005, Sefton et al. 2007, Egas and Riedl 2008, Gächter et al. 2008, Nikiforakis 2008, Nikiforakis and 
Norman 2008). While these studies do not explicitly manipulate sanctioning opportunities within the 
group, they provide insights into the extent to which alternative sanctioning institutions can sustain 
cooperation in human societies. The majority of these existing studies suggest, much like our study, that 
different institutional arrangements can have a large positive impact on cooperation, but that the impact 
on the efficient provision of public goods or appropriation from common-pool resources is rather limited. 
  This study also connects to an emerging literature examining the role of social and geographic 
network structures on public good provision. Theoretical investigations (Bramoullé and Kranton 2007) 
and experimental evidence (Yamagishi and Cook 1993, Fatas et al. 2010) point to the fact that 
contribution levels may differ significantly across networks. Differences in contributions across such 
networks are explained by conditionally cooperative responses to the restricted spread of information 
about individual contributions (Fatas et al. 2010).  
Closely related to our study are experiments in which punishment opportunities in public goods 
settings are manipulated (Carpenter 2007a, O’Gorman et al. 2009, Carpenter et al. 2011). Carpenter 
(2007a) varies the group size and monitoring opportunities between groups (i.e., information about others 
contributions and availability to sanction those) and finds that monitoring opportunities determine 
contribution levels more than group size. O’Gorman et al. (2009) investigate if a solitary punisher in a 
group can sustain cooperation. They find that contribution levels are similar in a situation where there is 
only one punisher in a group as compared to a situation where all group members are allowed to punish. 
A recent paper by Carpenter et al. (2011) uses properties from graph theory to understand the behavior in 
public goods experiments with eight different monitoring and sanctioning opportunities.  
Our study provides first evidence on the relationship between punishment network density, 
network structure and punishment capacity in public goods settings, and differs in several aspects from 
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the previous literature. First, we study the bare effect of punishment networks, as we provide complete 
information about individual contributions, sanctions imposed, and sanctions received for all group 
members. This contrasts with Carpenter (2007) and Carpenter et al. (2011) who study the joint effect of 
information dissemination and punishment opportunities in networks where group members do not 
receive information on individual behavior outside their network. Second, we use a partner-matching 
protocol with fixed identifiers, while the other studies use a stranger-matching protocol. The advantage of 
the partner-matching protocol with fixed identifiers is that it captures the essence of networks (i.e., a fixed 
group of individuals that are linked) and not just the network architecture (i.e., the way a random group of 
individuals is linked).
1 Third, we control across networks the individual punishment endowments and the 
total punishment capacity within a group. In the previous studies, the individual punishment endowments 
are determined by previous contributions to the public good and, thus, total punishment capacities differ 
systematically across networks. In contrast to these other studies, we are able to identify the role of the 
punishment network itself and can rule out potential endowment effects. Fourth, we investigate appealing 
unexplored network structures. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the decision setting. 
Section III presents the experimental results. Section IV contains concluding comments. 
 
II. THE DECISION SETTING 
This study includes data from experimental sessions conducted at Indiana University-
Bloomington (U.S.) and the University of East Anglia (U.K.).  In each session, 12 to 20 subjects were 
recruited from subject databases that included undergraduates from a wide range of disciplines.  Via the 
computer, subjects were privately and anonymously assigned to four-person groups and remained in these 
                                                           
1 A possible disadvantage is that reputation building is easier in the partner-matching protocol. However, since our 
primary interest lies in comparing punishment networks and not in disentangling the motivation of individual actors, 
we believe that the partner-matching protocol is more suited for our purposes. Disentangling the motivation of 
individual actors in a public goods experiment, even if it uses stranger-matching, is very difficult. First, it is difficult 
to distinguish between different non-selfish motivations such as inequity-version, reciprocity, or spite. Second, other 
studies show that a substantial fraction of contributions are due to confusion and errors rather than non-selfish 
motivations (Andreoni 1995). 
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groups throughout the session.  No subject could identify which of the others in the room was assigned to 
their group. Since no information passed across groups, each session involved 3 to 5 independent groups. 
At the beginning of each session, subjects privately read a set of instructions, which were then 
summarized publicly by a member of the research team.
2  Subjects then took a post instruction quiz and 
were not allowed to continue until all answers were correct.  Subjects made all decisions privately.  
In our initial set of experiments, there was one treatment condition in which sanctions could not 
be imposed, the no-punishment network, and three treatment conditions that allowed for sanctions: 
complete network, pairwise network, and an untouchable network.  As discussed below, an additional set 
of experiments were conducted with punishment networks referred to as pairwise-6 and untouchable-6 
networks. Table 1 presents summary information related to subject groups in each of the conditions. In 
aggregate, data were collected from 76 four-person groups.
3  Each group participated in a sequence of 20 
decision rounds with two stages in each decision round.  In the experiments conducted in the U.S., the 
conversation rate of tokens to dollars was 20 to 1.  In the U.K., the conversation of tokens to pounds was 
30 to 1.
4 
Stage 1 of each decision round was a linear VCM game. At the beginning of Stage 1, each subject 
was endowed with ten tokens to be allocated between a private account and a group account.  For each 
token placed in his or her private account a subject received 1 token in payment. For each token placed in 
the group account, each group member received 0.4 tokens in payment.  After all subjects had made their 
decisions in Stage 1, they were informed of the aggregate allocations to the group account, the allocation 
of each member of their group to the group account identified by an anonymous ID letter (A, B, C, or D), 
and their own earnings for the round.  Individual decisions were linked to subject identifiers (A, B, C, D) 
                                                           
2 See Appendix I for a copy of the instructions. The programs were written using Z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). 
3  Subject’s experimental earnings averaged $22 in the U.S., including a $5 show-up payment, and £15 in the U.K., 
including a £3 show-up payment.  Experiments lasted from one to one and one half hours. 
 
4 These differential exchange rates were chosen to create experimental earnings that yielded approximately the same 
real valued payoffs across locations.  
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which remained the same during all decision rounds.  Thus, unlike many of the earlier decision settings 
that investigated the use of sanctioning mechanisms, it was feasible for subject-specific reputations to 
develop across rounds (see Fehr and Gächter 2000, and Sefton et al. 2007).  The network treatment 
conditions are the primary rationale for this particular parameterization.  As discussed below, the pairwise 
networks implied that pairs of subjects knew they were linked across decision rounds.  The untouchable 
networks implied that one group member could neither receive nor deliver sanctions across rounds. 
  In Stage 2 of each decision round each subject received an additional endowment of six tokens.  
Subjects were informed that they would make a decision of whether to decrease the earnings of other 
members in their group by assigning deduction tokens to them.  Each deduction token assigned by a 
group member to another group member cost the initiator 1 token and decreased the earnings of the 
recipient by 3 tokens.  In our initial set of experiments subjects could assign a maximum of 2 deduction 
tokens to another group member, reducing that subjects earnings by a maximum of 6 tokens, regardless of 
the treatment condition. Thus, in the initial set of experiments, the maximum sanction that a subject could 
impose on another subject was held constant across decision rounds, while the maximum number of 
punishment tokens a subject could receive varied across networks.   
Any tokens not used to decrease the earnings of other group members were kept in subject’s 
private account. The instructions used neutral language. The term sanctioning was not used.  Subjects 
were told that they would have the opportunity to assign deduction tokens that would reduce the earnings 
of the subject to whom the tokens were assigned. Following Stage 2 decisions, subjects received 
information regarding individual group allocations, sanctions imposed, and sanctions received. 
  Experimental conditions varied only in terms of opportunities for sanctioning defined by the 
network linkages.  In the complete network condition, subjects had the opportunity to reduce the earnings 
of all other group members.  In the paired network condition, subjects A and B had the opportunity to 
reduce the earnings of each other, but not C and D.  Likewise, subjects C and D had the opportunity to 
reduce the earnings of each other, but not A and B.  In the untouchable network condition, subjects A, B, 
and C had the opportunity to reduce the earnings of each other, but not subject D.  Further, subject D did 
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not have the opportunity to reduce the earnings of any group member (for control purposes, subject D 
automatically had 6 tokens allocated to their private account).   
Figure 1 illustrates our network treatments. As mentioned above, in all treatments information 
flow was held the same. In particular, every player received information about the contribution and 
sanction decisions of every other player in his/her group. Only the punishment opportunities depended on 
the network. An incoming arrow denotes that a player can be punished by the player from whom the 
arrow originates. An outgoing arrow denotes that a player can punish the receiving group member. 
  After completing the initial experiments, we conducted an additional set of experiments in the 
pairwise and untouchable networks, where the maximum number of deductions tokens that a subject 
could receive was equal to that of the complete network. This meant that in the pairwise network each 
subject could impose up to 6 punishment tokens on the subject with whom they were paired. In the 
untouchable network, the three subjects in the punishment network could impose up to 3 punishment 
tokens on the other two subjects in their network. Thus, in these additional treatment conditions, subjects 
in the networks could have their earnings reduced from punishments by a maximum of 18 tokens, the 
same as in the complete network condition. As noted above, we refer to these two networks as pairwise-6 
and untouchable-6. 
 The  no-punishment network was conducted as a benchmark. Parallel to the approach taken in 
Sefton et al. (2007), this treatment also contained 2 stages. In Stage 2, however, subjects were simply 
given an additional 6 tokens which were placed in their private accounts.  Otherwise, the treatment was 
conducted in same manner as the treatments that allowed for sanctioning opportunities.   
  In all treatment conditions, subjects played a finitely repeated game with a known final round. 
Under the assumption that it is common knowledge that subjects maximize own-earnings, the theoretical 
prediction is straightforward.  The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for each treatment condition calls 
for zero allocations to the group account and no-sanctions.
5  As noted earlier, however, experimental 
                                                           
5 In the sanction treatments there are other Nash equilibria, including some that support efficient allocations. 
However, equilibrium strategies that support efficient allocations rely on non-credible threats to sanction free riders. 
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studies of the linear VCM game typically find that the level of cooperation observed is not consistent with 
equilibrium predictions of zero provision of the group good. Moreover, other studies have shown that 
subjects often pay to sanction other participants when the opportunity is available. However, at the same 
time subjects react to changes in the price and effectiveness of punishment (Carpenter 2007b), suggesting 
that players strategically assess the cost and benefits of various sanctioning strategies. At the core of our 
investigation is the question how network structure and disposable punishment capacities affect these 
considerations.     
 
III. RESULTS 
  We first present the results of the group level analysis which is followed by the results of the 
individual analysis. We begin with a graphical presentation and summary statistics that focus on group 
level data across decision rounds in the initial set of network conditions, and follow with a discussion of 
the  pairwise-6 and untouchable-6  networks. This descriptive analysis is followed by a more formal 
regression analysis that incorporates the panel nature of the data. The results presented below pool the 
data from both experimental sites because the preliminary analyses indicated no significant location 
effects. 
 
Group Level Results 
Descriptive Overview 
The discussion of results from the initial treatment conditions focuses on three key outcome 
variables: 1) tokens allocated to the group account by each four-person group, 2) total tokens used for 
sanctioning by each four-person group, 3) tokens earned by each group. Figure 2a displays the trajectory 
of mean group allocations, Figure 2b of sanctions and Figure 2c of earnings for the complete networks 
(mean across 17 groups), the pairwise networks (across 14 groups) and the untouchable networks (across 
15 groups). These are compared to the mean group allocations and earnings for the no-punishment 
networks (across 7 groups). To complement the results displayed in Figures 2 a-c, Table 2 presents the 
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means and standard deviations of per-round group allocations, group earnings, and sanctions per group, 
pooled over decision rounds. Trends and differences across treatments noted here are based on cursory 
observation. We test formally for the significance of these differences using the regression analysis that 
follows this overview. 
In all treatments, average group allocations start at around 50% of the group endowment of 40 
tokens. In the no-punishment networks, allocations decline over time to levels close to the Nash 
equilibrium allocation of zero. In the complete  networks, allocation levels slightly increase and are 
maintained at around 25 tokens throughout. Group allocations remain steady at around 20 tokens across 
rounds 1-18 in the untouchable networks. However, allocations are always lower than those in the 
complete networks. In sharp contrast, group allocations decline steadily over time in the pairwise 
networks.  
Average group sanctions in the complete and untouchable networks are similar in most rounds 
and remain steady at around 2.5 tokens per round. In the pairwise networks average group sanctions are 
lower than in the complete and the untouchable networks in all 20 rounds. In all three networks, there is 
an increase in sanctions used in the last round. Note that the average level of sanctions imposed is lower 
than in most studies, in particular Sefton et al. (2007). However, although endowments that could be used 
for sanctioning were equivalent between our study and Sefton et al. (2007), the opportunity for an 
individual to sanction another individual was not equivalent. In Sefton et al. (2007), for example, an 
individual could use his/her full endowment to sanction another individual.  In our initial punishment 
network conditions, subjects were constrained to use no more than 2 tokens in sanctioning another 
individual 
While there are differences in group allocations and sanctioning behavior across the treatments, 
group earnings display a similar pattern over time. Earnings in the no-punishment networks are higher 
than those in the other three networks in the first few rounds and in the last round. However, between 
rounds 5 and 19, there is no systematic difference in earnings across network conditions.   
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  Figures 3a-c show the trajectory of mean group allocations (3a), sanctions (3b) and earnings (3c) 
for the pairwise networks and the pairwise-6 networks. As shown, with only one exception, there are no 
apparent differences between these network conditions across decision rounds.
6 Figures 4a-c show the 
trajectory of mean group allocations (4a), sanctions (4b) and earnings (4c) for the untouchable networks 
and the untouchable-6 networks.  As can be seen, group allocations start out higher (around 25) in the 
untouchable-6 networks. However, by round 15, there is no discernible difference in allocations.   
Interestingly, sanctioning is slightly lower in the untouchable-6 networks in all but 5 rounds.  The 
combination of higher group allocations and lower sanctions across most decision rounds implies that 
earnings are higher in the untouchable-6 networks. Figure 4c suggests that this might be the case. Table 2 
presents summary statistics on group allocations, sanctions and earnings for these network conditions. 
 
Group-level Regression Analysis 
  To examine statistical differences between punishment networks, Tables 3 and 4 present results 
from panel random effects regression analyses. The dependent variables are group allocations, group 
sanctions, and group earnings, with dummy variables used to capture treatment and round effects. For all 
regressions, the unit of observation is group g in round t (t = 1, 2, …, 20). Hence each group in each 
treatment has 20 observations. In summary for each of the dependent variables (group allocations, group 
sanctions, and group earnings), the estimated model, with robust standard errors clustered on independent 
groups, is: 
 Dependent  Variable  gt = α + β1 (completeg) +  β2 (pairwiseg) +  β3 (untouchableg) +  
  β4 (pairwise-6g) + β5 (untouchable-6g)  + ∑ βj (round dummies) + εgt        
As can be deduced from Table 3, for the regressions on group allocations and group earnings, the omitted 
“comparison” treatment condition is the no-punishment network condition. For the sanctions regression, 
the omitted comparison treatment condition is the complete network condition. For completeness, Table 4 
                                                           
6 The exception is in round 7 where sanctions are higher in the pairwise-6 networks, which leads to lower earnings 
since there is no difference in group allocations. 
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provides additional statistical comparisons of coefficient estimates of the treatment dummies, Wald tests, 
across all treatments pairs that cannot be ascertained from the results presented in Table 3.  
The panel level data analysis largely confirms the observations drawn from the overview.
7  We 
begin with a discussion of our initial three network conditions where we held constant the capacity 
individuals had to impose sanctions Relative to the no-punishment networks, group allocations are 
significantly higher in the complete networks (p = 0.000) and the untouchable networks (p = 0.017), but 
not in the  pairwise networks (p = 0.316). Further, group allocations are clearly higher in the complete 
networks than in the pairwise networks (p = 0.007) and marginally higher than in the untouchable 
networks (p = 0.099). There is no significant difference between allocations in the pairwise and 
untouchable networks (p = 0.191). 
 
RESULT 1: The structure of the punishment network can significantly affect allocations to the public 
good. The network configurations investigated here suggest that broken punishment networks are less 
effective in increasing public goods contributions. 
 
Turning to punishment, we observe that sanctioning levels are similar in the in the complete and 
untouchable networks (p = 0.698). However, we also observe that sanctioning levels are significantly 
lower in the pairwise networks as compared to the other two networks (complete vs. pairwise, p = 0.009, 
untouchable vs. pairwise, p = 0.019).  
 
RESULT 2: The structure of the punishment network can significantly affect sanctioning levels. 
Sanctioning levels are lower in the pairwise networks than in the untouchable and complete networks, but 
there are no differences between the latter two.  
                                                           
7 OLS, Tobit and panel random effects models were estimated. The results are qualitatively similar for all the three 
models.  For brevity, only the results of the panel random effects regressions are presented. Estimated coefficients of 
the round dummies, which reflect the time trends observed in the figures, are not included. We report robust 
standard errors clustered on independent groups.   
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Table 3 confirms that there is no statistically significant difference in earnings between the no-
punishment networks and networks with sanctions (complete, p = 0.812,  pairwise, p = 0.479, 
untouchable,  p = 0.252). Table 4 confirms that there are no statistically significant differences in earnings 
across the other network conditions as well.  
 
RESULT 3: The structure of the investigated punishment networks does not significantly affect 
efficiencies. Higher contributions in denser networks come at the cost of higher group sanctions.  
 
To test whether results 1-3 are mainly driven by differences in absolute punishment capacity and 
not by the structure of the punishment networks, we compare group account allocations, sanctions, and 
earnings in the pairwise-6 networks and untouchable-6 networks to the other networks. First, we compare 
the pairwise networks to the pairwise-6 networks and then the untouchable networks to the untouchable-
6 networks. These comparisons will test whether an increase in the punishment capacity changes behavior 
holding the network structure constant. Thereafter, we compare the pairwise-6 networks and the 
untouchable-6 networks to the complete and no-punishment networks.  
Tables 3 and 4 provide statistical evidence for the patterns observed in Figures 3 a-c (for the two 
pairwise networks) and Figures 4 a-c (for the two untouchable networks). Group allocations are not 
significantly higher in the pairwise-6 than in the pairwise networks (p = 0.597) and in the untouchable-6 
than in the untouchable networks (p = 0.365). There is no significant difference between group sanctions 
in the pairwise-6 and the pairwise networks (p = 0.358), and in the untouchable-6 and the untouchable 
networks (p = 0.414). Thus, unsurprisingly we also observe little differences in earnings between the 
pairwise-6 and the pairwise networks (p = 0.739) as well as between the untouchable-6 and the 
untouchable networks (p = 0.229). 
Despite the identical punishment capacity between the pairwise-6, untouchable-6 and complete 
networks, contributions in the pairwise-6 networks are significantly lower than in the complete networks 
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(p = 0.009).  Moreover, contributions in the pairwise-6 networks are also marginally lower than in the 
untouchable-6 networks (p = 0.089) whereas contributions in the untouchable-6 networks are similar to 
contributions in the complete networks (p = 0.601). Group sanctions in the pairwise-6 networks and the 
untouchable-6 networks are lower than in the complete networks but the differences are not statistically 
significant (p = 0.232 and p = 0.264 respectively). Earnings in the pairwise-6 networks and the 
untouchable-6 networks are statistically indistinguishable from the earnings in the complete networks (p = 
0.583 and p = 0.674 respectively) and the no-punishment networks (p = 0.283 and p = 0.785 respectively).  
 
RESULT 4: The structure of the punishment network is more important than the absolute punishment 
capacity for determining group account allocations, sanctions, and efficiencies. 
 
Individual Level Results 
 
Individual Decisions: Pooling Across All Treatments 
 
  To complement our group level analysis, we turn to an analysis of decisions of individual group 
members. We begin with a comparison of individual allocations to the group account across treatments. 
Based on the group level results, we pool the data for the pairwise and the pairwise-6 networks under the 
heading combined-pairwise networks and the data from the untouchable and untouchable-6 networks 
under combined-untouchable networks. Table 5 presents panel random effects estimates from a model 
incorporating the following explanatory variables: one-period lagged allocation of individual i, one-period 
lagged positive deviation of i’s allocation from the average allocation of the other group members, one-
period lagged negative deviation of i’s allocation from the average allocation of the other group members 
and one-period lagged sanctions received (not applicable for the no-punishment condition). Also included, 
but not reported, are round dummy variables.
8 
                                                           
8 We report robust standard errors clustered on independent groups.  The results are robust to OLS and Tobit 
specifications. 
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We observe that an individual’s group allocation in a round is highly influenced by his/her 
allocation in the previous decision round; in all treatments the previous round’s allocation has a similarly 
significant positive impact on the current allocation (coefficient varies from 0.873 to 0.965; p < 0.00). 
Positive deviations from the average allocation of other group members in the previous round also have a  
significant negative impact on current allocations and negative deviations from the average allocation 
others has a positive impact. Table 5 highlights that sanctions received in the previous round have a s 
positive significant impact on current allocations  in the combined-pairwise and combined-untouchable 
networks (p = 0.041 and p=.013 respectively), but not in the complete networks.   
  The nature of individual behavior in repeated public goods settings is often characterized as 
conditional cooperation. In incomplete networks, the network structure and players’ positions in the 
network are likely to influence how they adjust their behavior to that of the other group members. The 
above regressions do not distinguish between group members who are linked to a particular individual in 
a group from those in the group who are not linked to that individual. To better understand the effect of 
changing network structures on the nature of conditional cooperation, the analyses in the two following 
sections investigate how the network position in the pairwise and untouchable networks impacts group 
allocations.  
 
Individual Decisions in the Pairwise Networks 
    This section focuses on the determinants of individual allocations in the pairwise and the 
pairwise-6 networks. It is an open question as to whether and to what extent an individual’s allocations 
are influenced by the decisions of the subject that he/she is linked to in the punishment network and by 
the decisions of the other subjects outside the punishment network. More precisely, subject A in the 
network might be influenced by the allocation of subject B and vice-versa (similarly for subjects C and 
D). However, in our experiment, each individual has information on the decisions of all others in his/her 
group. Thus, it is also possible that, within a group, subject A might be influenced by the decisions of 
subjects C and D even though he/she cannot be sanctioned by either of them.  
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  To control for the linkages across pairs of subjects within groups, Table 6 presents the results 
from a random effects panel regression of individual allocations in a model incorporating the following 
explanatory variables: lagged allocation of subject i, lagged deviation from the subject with whom subject 
i is paired in the network, lagged deviation from the mean group allocation of the other pair in the group, 
lagged sanctions received by i, and round dummy variables.  
The results indicate that both the lagged allocations of one’s partner and the lagged average 
allocation of the other pair significantly influence one’s allocation decisions (p < 0.001 for both 
coefficients) and the magnitudes are  similar  (coefficients for pairwise network are -0.273 and -0.256, 
respectively and coefficients for the pairwise-6 network  are -0.138 and -0.178 respectively). Thus, it 
appears that individuals base their decisions on lagged deviations of all other group members equally.  
Table 6 highlights an additional insight in regard to the effect of received sanctions on allocations 
to the public good. While the variable lagged sanctions received is positive but insignificant when 
pooling both pairwise networks, this variable is significantly negative in the pairwise networks but 
significantly positive in the pairwise-6 networks. This results suggests that in the pairwise networks 
sanctions have a negative impact on contributions when the punishment capacity is small (for every unit 
of sanctioning received contributions are reduced by 0.418; p = 0.014) but a positive impact on 
contributions when the punishment capacity is large (for every unit of sanctioning received contributions 
are increased by 0.295; p = 0.002). The findings in Table 6 suggest that the relative importance of 
diminishing contribution levels and adjustment to the mean exceed the threat of being punished during 
future interactions with the network partner in pairwise networks, whereas the greater punishment 
capacity in pairwise-6 networks yields a sufficiently high expected punishment in subsequent rounds, 
leading to increased contributions levels by subjects who have received sanctions.  
 
RESULT 5: In two pairwise network conditions, subjects condition their contributions equally on 
contributions from subjects in and outside their punishment network.  Subjects’ next round contribution 
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response to being sanctioned depends on punishment capacity, negative when capacity is low and positive 
when capacity is high. 
 
Individual Decisions in the Untouchable Networks 
We now focus on individual allocations in the untouchable and the untouchable-6 networks. In 
these networks, within groups, subjects assigned the positions A, B and C are allowed to sanction each 
other. Subjects assigned the position D (the untouchable) face no threat of receiving sanctions. In the 
analysis below, we investigate the determinants of the allocation decisions of subjects in the A, B, and C 
positions separately from those in the D position.  
Figures 5a and 5b presents the trajectory of mean allocations and earnings by subjects assigned to 
the A, B, C and D positions across decision rounds. As shown, there is a pronounced decrease in the 
pattern of observations for the subjects in the D position, relative to those in the A, B, and C positions. 
The mean allocation per round by subjects in the A, B and C positions is 5.89 tokens while the mean per 
round allocation of subjects in the D position is 3.85 tokens (n = 26 groups, p = 0.0006). Out of 26 
observations on subjects in the D position, 18 of those subjects had mean allocations below those of the 
other members of their group. Out of the 26 subjects, only one in the D position had a mean group 
allocation significantly greater than the other subjects in his/her group.  Since subjects in the untouchable 
position also do not spend resources on sanctioning, they earn significantly more than the other group 
members as seen from the second panel of Figure 5. The mean per round earnings of subjects in the A, B 
and C positions is 15.98 tokens while the mean per round earnings of subjects in the D position is 20.75 
tokens (n = 26 groups, p = 0.000). 
Interestingly, the presence of an untouchable does not appear to have a detrimental effect on the 
willingness to contribute by the other subjects in the same group. There is no significant difference 
between the mean allocation by subjects in the A, B and C positions (5.89 tokens) in comparison to the 
mean allocation of subjects in the complete networks of 6.50 tokens (ncomplete = 17, nuntouchables = 26, p = 
0.498). To examine more closely the factors that influence individual allocations of subjects in the A, B 
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and C positions, Table 7 reports the results from a random effects panel data regression of individual 
allocations on: the one-period lagged allocation of individual i, the one-period lagged deviation of i’s 
allocation from the allocation of D, the one-period lagged deviation of i’s allocation from the average 
allocation of the other members of his punishment network, a one-period lagged variable of sanctions 
received, and round dummies. In summary, allocations of subjects attached to the punishment networks 
are significantly influenced by their lagged allocations (p < 0.001) and the deviation of their lagged 
allocations from the average allocations of others in the punishment network (p < 0.001). In addition, 
their allocations are also negatively influenced by the deviation of their lagged allocations from the 
allocation of the untouchable (p < 0.001) suggesting that the untouchable can trigger higher contributions 
of the subjects in the punishment network. Finally, much like in the pairwise networks, we observe that 
the punishment capacity determines whether receiving sanctions has a negative (if capacity is small) or 
positive (if capacity is large) impact on contributions.  
Table 8 presents random effects estimates for the determinants of the allocations of subjects 
assigned to the untouchable position, D,  on the one-period lagged allocation of individual i, the one-
period lagged deviation of i’s allocation from the average allocation of others in the same group, and 
round dummies. As shown, the allocations of the subjects in the untouchable position are mostly 
influenced by lagged allocations. The variable, lagged deviation from mean allocations of other subjects 
in the group, is negative for both untouchable networks and highly significant when pooling data from the 
untouchable and untouchable-6 networks (p = 0.009). In summary, mean group allocations and earnings 
of the subjects in the untouchable position follow a trajectory that is similar to the others subjects in their 
groups, except that the level of group allocations is lower and earnings are higher. 
 
RESULT 6: Subjects in the untouchable position exploit the situation by contributing less to the group 
account; but they condition their behavior on allocations of the other subjects in their group. Subjects in 
groups with an untouchable are able to sustain high levels of contributions, although they condition their 
behavior on all other subjects in their group, including the untouchable.  





Patterns of Sanctioning Behavior 
Pooling across treatments and observations within the specified intervals, Figure 6 shows the 
relationship between average sanctions received by individuals and the deviation of their group allocation 
from the average allocations of others in their punishment network.
9 The figure also reports the amount of 
sanctions imposed within each interval. In the complete networks, we measure deviations from the 
average allocation of the other three individuals in a group, in the pairwise networks, the deviation 
between an individual’s allocation and that of the individual who is his network partner, and in the 
untouchable networks, the deviation from the average allocation of the other two individuals in the 
sanctioning network.  
The pattern of sanctioning behavior is similar to that observed in other studies (e.g., Sefton et. al. 
2007); i.e., mean sanctions received are larger when a subject’s allocation is further below the average 
allocation of others. There is also evidence of “revenge”, i.e., some subjects are sanctioned even when 
their allocations are above the mean of others. In previous studies, this behavior was referred to as “blind 
revenge.” Here, due to the information individuals have regarding the identity of others, the behavior is 
clearly not “blind.” 
  For a more formal analysis, Table 9 presents the results from two random effects regressions on 
sanctions received, one focusing on instances of negative deviations and the other on positive deviations.  
Sanctions received are regressed on the absolute value of negative or positive (including 0) deviation 
from the average contribution of the others in the individual’s punishment network, treatment dummies, 
group dummies and round dummies. The omitted treatment is the complete network. For the sake of 
brevity, the coefficient estimates of the group and round dummies are not reported. The regressions 
                                                           
9 Computing the average sanction for each category includes both sanctions imposed and instances in which a 
sanction was not imposed. 
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confirm the trends observed in the Figure 6. Greater negative deviations are penalized more heavily. 
Positive deviations are penalized, but there is no strong trend associated with the magnitude of deviations  
The coefficients for treatment dummies in the regression for negative deviations are also revealing. The 
coefficients of the dummy variables for the pairwise and pairwise-6 networks are negative and 
significant; indicating that sanctioning of individuals with larger negative deviations from others within 
the sanctioning network was less aggressive than in the complete networks. The coefficients of the 
dummy variables for the untouchable and untouchable-6 networks are positive and significant; indicating 
that sanctioning was more aggressive than in the complete networks. 
Finally, we also examined the relationship between sanctions imposed and the group allocations 
of those that sanction. Similar to past studies, there is ample evidence that those who sanction to the 
greatest extent tend to be those individuals with group allocations greater than the average of other group 
members. In support of the observation that there appears to be sanctioning aimed at revenge, we also 
find sanctioning by those who contribute below the average of other group members, although the 
average sanction imposed by this group is considerably smaller than the average sanction imposed by 
those who allocate above the mean contribution. 
 
RESULT 7: Similar to other studies, sanctions imposed are strongly correlated with negative deviations 
in contributions from contributions of other group members. Sanctions assigned are most strongly 
associated with individuals who allocate more to the group account than other group members. There is 
also evidence of sanctioning used for purposes of revenge.  
 
IV. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This study contributes to the literature on sanctioning behavior in social dilemma settings by 
examining the influence of alternative linkages between subjects that restrict the directional flow of 
endogenously imposed sanctions, as well as the capacity to sanction at the individual and group level. 
More specifically, our design investigates the capacity to sanction individuals in the network, as well as 
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the capacity to be sanctioned. Flow of information within the networks is controlled by allowing for 
complete information among all individuals in a group regarding individual group allocations, sanctions 
imposed, and sanctions received. 
In comparison to the no-punishment networks, the complete networks and the untouchable 
networks lead to greater allocations to the group good. The pairwise networks, however, do not lead to 
greater allocations than observed in the no-punishment  network. Importantly, there are important 
treatment effects across the punishment networks. Group allocations are higher in the complete networks 
in comparison to the pairwise and untouchable networks. However, because the increase in the level of 
group allocations is not sufficient to overcome the costs of imposed sanctions, the net result is no 
difference in earnings across the various network conditions.  
In order to examine the relative influence of network conditions and total punishment capacity, 
experiments are also conducted in which the maximum potential to sanction is held constant at the 
individual subject level in some network conditions and at the group level in others. The results regarding 
group allocations and earnings are robust to these two conditions.  
Asymmetric power in the untouchable network condition is shown to greatly influence the 
contribution patterns and income distributions across actors. The asymmetric possibility to free-ride at the 
costs to others, with no possibility of being sanctioned, leads to a situation where contributions by the 
untouchable are below the group average contributions of those in the punishment network  
Our results may have implications for public policy and organizational thinking related to the 
pervasive conflict of individual interest and collective efficiency. In a world of inherent asymmetries in 
information, monitoring, and sanctioning networks, a proper understanding of group structures and how 
individual actors connect to each other is crucially important when trying to understand the nature of 
voluntary cooperation. This study suggests that incomplete linkages between actors may be most 
important in the extreme case of subgroups who are completely insulated from sanctioning and that the 
existence of incomplete linkages may be more important than the overall capacity to sanction. This result 
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raises the question of whether and how collective action groups in the field can develop institutions or 
social norms to overcome such asymmetries. 
As far as can be deduced from our experimental setup, our study points to the potential dangers of 
implementing unbalanced economic unions or international agreements with detached actors who 
nevertheless profit from the provided collective good. Potential policy interventions and institutional 
designs based on sanctions need to pay close attention to the group’s underlying network structure in 
order to avoid creating unnecessary temptations to free-ride on the costs of others contributions as 
manifested in our untouchable network condition. The potential economic message of our study appears 
to be notable in an era of global commons and economic unification.  
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Table 1 - Design Information for Network Conditions 
 
Network Condition  Number of Groups 
U.S. 
Number of Groups 
U.K. 
Total Number of 
Independent Groups 
No-punishment  7 0  7 
Complete   9 8 17 
Pairwise   6 8 14 
Untouchable   8 7 15 
      
Pairwise-6  12 0  12 
Untouchable-6  11 0  11 
 
 












No-punishment  10.629 - 70.377 
(7 groups)  (8.744)  (5.246) 
Complete   26.017 2.532  69.481 
(17 groups)  (11.878)  (1.922)  (13.714) 
Pairwise   14.942 1.153  68.351 
(14 groups)  (11.406)  (1.0098)  (8.308) 
Untouchable  19.92 2.293 66.779 
(15 groups)  (9.365)  (1.622)  (9.979) 
      
Pairwise-6  16.867 1.696  67.337 
(12 groups)  (7.456)  (1.878)  (7.612) 
Untouchable-6  23.691 1.732  71.287 
(11 groups)  (11.740)  (1.885)  (9.490) 
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Group Allocations  Group 
Punishment  Group Earnings 
  
Complete  15.389*** …….  -0.896 
   (4.205) (3.767) 
Pairwise  4.314 -1.379***  -2.026 
   (4.304) (0.530)  (2.861) 
Untouchable  9.291** -0.239  -3.598 
   (3.906) (0.617)  (3.139) 
Pairwise-6  6.238* -0.837  -3.040 
   (3.743) (0.699)  (2.833) 
Untouchable-6  13.062*** -0.801  0.910 
   (4.623)  (0.717)  (3.337) 
Constant 13.106***  2.793***  70.916*** 
   (3.121)  (0.472)  (2.101) 
  
Obs. [cluster/groups]  1520 [76]  1380 [69]  1520 [76] 
 
For regressions 1 and 3, there are76 groups with 20 observations each (N = 76 * 20 = 1520). For regression 
2, there are 69 groups with 20 observations each (N = 69 * 20 = 1380). 
 
For the analysis on group allocations and group earnings, the reference category is the No-punishment 
network. For the analysis of group punishment, the reference category is the Complete network.   
 
Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on independent groups 
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Table 4 - Wald Tests (χ













           
Pairwise   7.25*** -  -  - 
(0.007)       
Untouchable  2.72* 1.71  -  - 
(0.099) (0.191)     
Pairwise-6   6.74*** 0.28  0.93  - 
(0.009) (0.597)  (0.334)     
Untouchable-6  0.27 3.71*  0.82  2.89* 











      
Untouchable  - 5.44**  -  - 
   (0.019)    
Pairwise-6   - 0.85  0.80  - 
   (0.358)  (0.372)    
Untouchable-6  - 0.90  0.67  0.00 











           
Pairwise   0.08 -  -  - 
(0.774)    
Untouchable  0.43 0.22  -  - 
(0.513) (0.637)     
Pairwise-6   0.30 0.11  0.03  - 
(0.583) (0.739)  (0.867)     
Untouchable-6  0.18 0.70  1.45  1.28 
(0.674) (0.404)  (0.229)  (0.258) 
Figures in parentheses are p-values. 
*** sig. at 1%, ** sig. at 5%, * sig. at 10% 
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Table 5 - Individual Allocations across Treatments 
 
 














Lagged allocation of i  0.889***  0.961***  0.947*** 0.913*** 
(0.056)  (0.013)  (0.015) (0.019) 
           
Lagged positive deviation from mean 
allocation of others in group 
-0.536***  -0.376***  -0.617*** -0.495*** 
(0.106)  (0.058)  (0.078) (0.053) 
           
Lagged absolute negative deviation from 
mean allocation of others in group 
0.385***  0.313**  0.181*** 0.176*** 
(0.038)  (0.137)  (0.065) (0.067) 
           
Lagged punishment received  -  -0.141  0.191** 0.224** 
      (0.098)  (0.093) (0.090) 
           
Constant 1.736**  1.318***  1.115*** 1.240*** 
   (0.731)  (0.373)  (0.342) (0.361) 
Observations [groups]  532 [7]  1292 [17]  1976 [26]  1976 [26] 
Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on independent groups 
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Lagged allocation of i  0.944*** 0.916***  0.939*** 
(0.019) (0.021)  (0.015) 
  
Lagged deviation from paired subject in 
network 
-0.273*** -0.138***  -0.198*** 
(0.024) (0.028)  (0.026) 
  
Lagged deviation from mean allocation of 
other pair in group 
-0.256*** -0.178***  -0.222*** 
(0.056) (0.049)  (0.040) 
  
Lagged punishment received  -0.418** 0.295***  0.089 
(0.170) (0.093)  (0.094) 
  
Constant 0.629***  0.484  0.436** 
   (0.216)  (0.426)  (0.220) 
  
Observations [groups]  1064 [14]  912 [12]  1976 [26] 
Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on independent groups
*** sig. at 1%, ** sig. at 5%, * sig. at 10% 
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Table 7 - Individual Allocations (A,B,C): Untouchable and Untouchable-6 Networks  
 










Lagged allocation of i 
0.930***  0.948*** 0.946*** 
(0.031)  (0.036) (0.021) 
  
Lagged deviation from allocation of  
Person D 
-0.088***  -0.102** -0.101*** 
(0.021)  (0.049) (0.022) 
  
Lagged deviation from mean allocation 
of others in punishment network 
-0.408***  -0.395*** -0.402*** 
(0.035)  (0.105) (0.042) 
  
Lagged punishment received 
-0.215*  0.113 -0.073 
(0.117)  (0.103) (0.089) 
  
Constant  0.298  1.410*** 0.712* 
   (0.579)  (0.417) (0.371) 
  
Observations [groups]  855 [15]  627 [11]  1482 [26] 
Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on independent groups 
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Table 8 - Individual Allocations (D): Untouchable and Untouchable-6 Networks 
 
 










Lagged allocation of i  0.813*** 0.869***  0.831*** 
(0.108) (0.072)  (0.066) 
  
Lagged deviation from mean allocation of 
A, B, C in group 
-0.133 -0.212*  -0.178*** 
(0.086) (0.121)  (0.068) 
  
Constant 2.664***  -1.054  1.088 
   (0.938)  (1.379)  (0.818) 
  
Observations [groups]  285 [15]  209 [11]  494 [26] 
Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on independent groups 
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Table 9 - Determinants of Punishment Received by Individuals 
 
Dependent Variable: Individual Punishment Received 
   Negative  Positive 
   Deviations  Deviations 
        
Absolute value of negative  0.218***  ‐ 
deviations (0.023)    
        
Absolute value of positive   -  0.019** 
deviations      (0.008) 
        
Pairwise  -0.389*** -0.127*** 
   (0.075) (0.009) 
        
Untouchable  0.462*** -0.065*** 
   (0.087) (0.023) 
        
Pairwise-6  -0.819*** -0.246*** 
   (0.065) (0.016) 
        
Untouchable-6  1.938*** 0.019 
   (0.062)  (0.017) 
        
Constant -0.209  0.259*** 
   (0.205)  (0.069) 
        
Observations [groups]  1566 [68]  3434 [69] 
Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on 
independent groups 
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Notes: In all treatments information flow was held the same, indicated by the lines between players. 
Every player received information about the contribution and punishment decisions of every other player 
in her group. Only the punishment opportunities depended on the network. An incoming arrow denotes 
that a player can be punished by the player from whom the arrow originates. An outgoing arrow denotes 
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Deviation from the Average Allocation of Others in Punishment Network
Figures in parentheses are the number of non−zero observations in each category
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Appendix 1 – Instructions for the Complete Network 
Thank you for coming! This is an experiment about decision-making. You will receive $5 for showing up 
on time. If you follow the instructions carefully, you can earn more money depending both on your own 
decisions and on the decisions of others.  
 
These instructions and your decisions in this experiment are solely your private information. During the 
experiment you are not allowed to communicate with any of the other participants or with anyone outside 
the laboratory. Please switch off your mobile phone now. If you have any questions at any time during the 
course of this experiment, please raise your hand. An experimenter will assist you privately.  
The experiment consists of twenty (20) consecutive decision rounds. Your total earnings will be the 
sum of your earnings from all these rounds.  
At the beginning of the experiment, participants will be randomly divided into groups of four (4) 
individuals. The composition of the groups will remain the same in each round. This means that you will 
interact with the same people in your group throughout the experiment. For record keeping purposes, the 
computer will randomly assign each individual in a group an ID letter, either A, B, C or D. You, and each 
of the other group members, will have the same ID for the rest of this experiment. Thus, if you are 
assigned to be individual A in your group, your ID will be A in all 20 decision rounds. 
This experiment is structured so that the other participants will never be informed about your personal 
decisions or earnings from the experiment. You will record your decisions privately at your computer 
terminal. You will be paid individually and privately in cash at the end of the experiment.  
 
During the experiment all decisions and transfers are made in tokens (more details below). Your total 
earnings will also be calculated in tokens and, at the end of the experiment will be converted to Dollars at 
the following rate: 
20 tokens = $1 
 
First Stage of each round 
 
You are a member of a group of four participants. At the beginning of each round, each member is 
endowed with 10 tokens. Your task is to allocate them fully or partially either into your private 
account or to a group account. Each token not allocated to the group account will automatically remain 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2012 - 00441 
 
in your private account. Your total earnings include earnings from both your private account and the 
group account. All participants in your group will simultaneously face the same decision situation.  
 
Your earnings from the private account in each round 
 
You will earn one (1) token for each token allocated to your private account. No other member in 
your group will earn from your private account.  
 
Your earnings from the group account in each round 
 
For each token you allocate to the group account, you will earn 0.4 tokens. Each of the other three 
people in your group will also earn 0.4 tokens. Thus, the allocation of 1 token to the group account 
yields a total of 1.6 tokens for all of you together. Your earnings from the group account are based on 
total number of tokens invested by all members in your group. Each member will profit equally from the 
amount allocated to the group account. For each token allocated to the group account, each group member 
will earn 0.4 tokens regardless of who made the allocation. This means that you will earn from your own 
allocation as well as from the allocations of others.  
 
Your total earnings in Stage 1 in each round 
 
Your total earnings consist of earnings from your private account and the earnings from the group 
account.  
 
Your earnings in Stage 1 = Earnings from your private account + Earnings from the group account    
 
 
The following examples are for illustrative purposes only. 
 
Example1. Assume that you have allocated 0 tokens to the group account. Suppose that each of the other 
group members has also allocated 0 tokens to the group account. Thus the total number of tokens in the 
group account in your group is 0. Your earnings from Stage 1 of this round will be 10 tokens (10 tokens 
from your private account and 0 tokens from the group account). The earnings of the other group 
members in Stage 1 of this round will be 10 tokens each.   
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Example2. Assume that you have allocated 5 tokens to the group account. Suppose that each of the other 
group members has allocated 0 tokens to the group account. Thus the total number of tokens in the group 
account in your group is 5. Your earnings from Stage 1 of this round will be 7 tokens (= 5 tokens from 
your private account and 5* 0.4 = 2 tokens from the group account). The earnings of the other group 
members from Stage 1 of this round will be 12 tokens (= 10 tokens from the private account + 5 * 0.4 = 2 
tokens from the group account) each. 
 
Example3. Assume that you have allocated 10 tokens to the group account. Suppose that each of the 
other group members has also allocated 10 tokens to the group account. Thus the total number of tokens 
in the group account in your group is 40. Your earnings from Stage 1 of this round will be 16 tokens (= 0 
tokens from your private account and 40* 0.4 = 16 tokens from the group account). The earnings of the 
other group members will similarly be 16 tokens each.  
 
Second Stage of each round 
 
After all individuals have made their decisions in the first stage, the computer will tabulate the results. 
You will be informed of the total allocation to the group account and the individual allocation decisions 
of each group member. Group members will be identified by their IDs, which will remain the same in 
each round. Group members will be listed alphabetically by their IDs.   
 
In the second stage, each person will receive an additional endowment of six tokens. You will now 
make a decision whether to decrease the earnings of other members in your group by assigning 
deduction tokens to them. Each deduction token you assign to another group member costs you 1 
token and will decrease the earnings of that group member by 3 tokens. You can assign a maximum 
of 2 deduction tokens to any group member. If you do not want to change the earnings of a specific group 
member, you will assign a 0 to that group member. Any tokens not used to decrease the earnings of 
other group members will be kept in your private account. You will earn 1 token for each token kept 
in your private account.  
 
To which group member you can assign deduction tokens depends on your ID letter as detailed below. Your ID 
letter also determines who can assign deduction tokens to you. 
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Person A can assign deduction tokens to persons B, C and D. For each of the other three group members, 
you will decide how many deduction tokens to assign him/her. The maximum number of deduction 
tokens you can assign to persons B, C and D is 2 each. 
Person B can assign deduction tokens to persons A, C and D. For each of the other three group members, 
you will decide how many deduction tokens to assign him/her. The maximum number of deduction 
tokens you can assign to persons A, C and D is 2 each. 
Person C can assign deduction tokens to persons A, B and D. For each of the other three group members, 
you will decide how many deduction tokens to assign him/her. The maximum number of deduction 
tokens you can assign to persons A, B and D is 2 each. 
Person D can assign deduction tokens to persons A, B and C. For each of the other three group members, 
you will decide how many deduction tokens to assign him/her. The maximum number of deduction 
tokens you can assign to persons A, B and C is 2 each. 
 
 
Notice that due to the varying possibilities to assign deduction tokens to other group members, the 
prospect of receiving deduction tokens differs according to the ID letter. The following illustration 
clarifies the interaction structure at the second decisions stage. An outgoing arrowhead means that you 
can assign up to 2 deduction tokens to the receiving group member. An incoming arrowhead means that 
you can be assigned up to 2 deduction tokens by the group member from whom the arrow originates. 
 
 
Figure1. Illustration of the interaction structure in the second stage 
 
For instance, consider person A in Figure 1. An outgoing arrow from A to B means that person A can 
assign up to 2 deduction tokens to person B. An incoming arrow from D to A means that person A can be 
assigned up to 2 deduction tokens by person D.  
 
Your total earnings in Stage 2 in each round 
Your earnings in Stage 2 = 6  
A  B 
C  D 
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- Total number of deduction tokens used by you  
- 3 * Total number of deductions tokens assigned to you by other group members 
 
To summarize, your total earnings from each round will be calculated as follows: 
 
Your total earnings in each round =  
         Earnings from the first stage (in TOKENs) + 
   Earnings  from  the  second  stage  (in  TOKENs) 
 
After all participants have made their decisions in the first and second decision stage, the number of 
tokens you earned in the corresponding round will be displayed to you and stored in the computer. Notice 
that your total calculated earnings in tokens at the end of a decision round can be negative if the costs from assigned 
and received deduction tokens exceed your combined earnings from the first stage and tokens kept in the individual 
account in the second stage. 
 
Your earnings from earlier rounds cannot be used in the following rounds. You will receive a new 
endowment for the first and second decision stage in each round. The same process will be repeated for a 
total of 20 rounds. If your cumulative earnings from all 20 rounds at the end of the experiment are 
negative, the computer will automatically record zero earnings for you from the experiment. Thus, while 




At any time, a history table with a summary of decisions and earnings in the previous round will be 
available. For each group member, the table will report the number of tokens he/she allocated to the group 
account in the first stage. In addition, the table will also report the number of deduction tokens assigned 
by a group member to every other group member. Finally, the table will also report the total number of 
deduction tokens received, earnings from the round and total cumulative earnings for each group member. 
Once again, the group members will be listed alphabetically by their ID letters. Figure 2 below presents 
the history table you will see. 
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Figure 2: Table with summary of decisions and earnings from the previous round 
 
To see the history screen, click the ‘History of previous round’ button at the bottom of your screen. To 





























A     ‐                   
B        ‐                
C           ‐             
D              ‐          
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Questions to help you better understand the decision tasks 
 
When everyone has finished reading the instructions, and before the experiment begins, we will ask you a few 
questions regarding the decisions you will make in the experiment. The questions will help you understand the 
calculation of your earnings and ensure that you have understood the instructions.  
 
Please answer these questions on your computer terminal. Please type your answer in the box next to the 
corresponding question. Once you have answered all questions correctly we will begin the experiment.  
 
 
Instructions for Paired Network Related to Stage 2 
 
Second Stage of each round 
 
After all individuals have made their decisions in the first stage, the computer will tabulate the results. 
You will be informed of the total allocation to the group account and the individual allocation decisions 
of each group member. Group members will be identified by their IDs, which will remain the same in 
each round. Group members will be listed alphabetically by their IDs.   
 
In the second stage, each person will receive an additional endowment of six tokens. You will now 
make a decision whether to decrease the earnings of other members in your group by assigning 
deduction tokens to them. Each deduction token you assign to another group member costs you 1 
token and will decrease the earnings of that group member by 3 tokens. You can assign a maximum 
of 2 deduction tokens to any group member. If you do not want to change the earnings of a specific group 
member, you will assign a 0 to that group member. Any tokens not used to decrease the earnings of 
other group members will be kept in your private account. You will earn 1 token for each token kept 
in your private account.  
 
To which group member you can assign deduction tokens depends on your ID letter as detailed below. Your ID 
letter also determines who can assign deduction tokens to you. 
 
Person A can assign deduction tokens to person B alone. You will decide how many deduction tokens to 
assign person B. The maximum number of deduction tokens you can assign to persons B is 2. Four tokens 
out of your endowment of 6 tokens will automatically be transferred to your private account. 
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Person B can assign deduction tokens to person A alone. You will decide how many deduction tokens to 
assign person A. The maximum number of deduction tokens you can assign to persons A is 2. Four 
tokens out of your endowment of 6 tokens will automatically be transferred to your private account. 
Person C can assign deduction tokens to person D alone. You will decide how many deduction tokens to 
assign person D. The maximum number of deduction tokens you can assign to persons D is 2. Four 
tokens out of your endowment of 6 tokens will automatically be transferred to your private account. 
Person D can assign deduction tokens to person C alone. You will decide how many deduction tokens to 
assign person C. The maximum number of deduction tokens you can assign to persons C is 2. Four tokens 
out of your endowment of 6 tokens will automatically be transferred to your private account. 
 
 
Notice that due to the varying possibilities to assign deduction tokens to other group members, the 
prospect of receiving deduction tokens differs according to the ID letter. The following illustration 
clarifies the interaction structure at the second decisions stage. An outgoing arrowhead means that you 
can assign up to 2 deduction tokens to the receiving group member. An incoming arrowhead means that 




Figure1. Illustration of the interaction structure in the second stage 
 
For instance, consider person A in Figure 1. An outgoing arrow from A to B means that person A can 
assign up to 2 deduction tokens to person B. An incoming arrow from C to A means that person A can be 
assigned up to 2 deduction tokens by person C.  
 
  
A  B 
C  D 
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Instructions for Untouchable Network related to Stage 2 
 
Second Stage of each round 
 
After all individuals have made their decisions in the first stage, the computer will tabulate the results. 
You will be informed of the total allocation to the group account and the individual allocation decisions 
of each group member. Group members will be identified by their IDs, which will remain the same in 
each round. Group members will be listed alphabetically by their IDs.   
 
In the second stage, each person will receive an additional endowment of six tokens. You will now 
make a decision whether to decrease the earnings of other members in your group by assigning 
deduction tokens to them. Each deduction token you assign to another group member costs you 1 
token and will decrease the earnings of that group member by 3 tokens. You can assign a maximum 
of 2 deduction tokens to any group member. If you do not want to change the earnings of a specific group 
member, you will assign a 0 to that group member. Any tokens not used to decrease the earnings of 
other group members will be kept in your private account. You will earn 1 token for each token kept 
in your private account.  
 
To which group member you can assign deduction tokens depends on your ID letter as detailed below. Your ID 
letter also determines who can assign deduction tokens to you. 
 
Person A can assign deduction tokens to persons B and C. For each of these two group members, you 
will decide how many deduction tokens to assign him/her. The maximum number of deduction tokens 
you can assign to persons B and C is 2 each. Two tokens out of your endowment of 6 tokens will 
automatically be transferred to your private account. 
Person B can assign deduction tokens to persons C and A. For each of these two group members, you 
will decide how many deduction tokens to assign him/her. The maximum number of deduction tokens 
you can assign to persons C and A is 2 each. Two tokens out of your endowment of 6 tokens will 
automatically be transferred to your private account. 
Person C can assign deduction tokens to persons A and B. For each of these two group members, you 
will decide how many deduction tokens to assign him/her. The maximum number of deduction tokens 
you can assign to persons A and B is 2 each. Two tokens out of your endowment of 6 tokens will 
automatically be transferred to your private account. 
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Person D can NOT assign deduction tokens to anyone. You entire endowment of 6 tokens will be 
transferred to your private account. 
 
Notice that due to the varying possibilities to assign deduction tokens to other group members, the 
prospect of receiving deduction tokens differs according to the ID letter. The following illustration 
clarifies the interaction structure at the second decisions stage. An outgoing arrowhead means that you 
can assign up to 2 deduction tokens to the receiving group member. An incoming arrowhead means that 




Figure1. Illustration of the interaction structure in the second stage 
 
For instance, consider person A in Figure 1. An outgoing arrow from A to B means that person A can 
assign up to 2 deduction tokens to person B. An incoming arrow from C to A means that person A can be 












A  B 
C  D 
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